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BY ARTHUR W. WRIGHT
Fiscal  crunch  or  not,  people,  pun-
dits  and  pols  would  agree  that  one 
of  our  highest  priorities  is  making 
health care more accessible for every-
one.    Neighboring  Massachusetts 
has  taken  the  lead,  along  with  U.S. 
Senate  Democrats  like  Max  Baucus 
and  hillary  Clinton.    But  is  the 
Massachusetts plan the wave of the 
future?    Or  will  we  soon  be  waving 
goodbye to it instead?
  The Bay State’s plan, signed into law 
in April 2006, has attracted rapt atten-
tion, pro and con.  Whichever way one 
comes at it, the Act Providing Access 
to  Affordable,  Quality,  Accountable 
Health Care (APAAQAHC for “short”) 
illustrates the core issues in the nation-
al debate over health insurance.  For 
that  reason,  we  Nutmeggers  may  be 
able to learn what to do, or what not 
to  do,  about  health  insurance  from 
the experience of our neighbor to the 
north.    And,  come  early  2009,  the 
Massachusetts  experiment  will  like-
ly  figure  in  the  debate  over  national 
health insurance policy.
ThE hEAlTh INSURANCE GAP
  The  fundamental  issue  in  the 
debate is the so-called health insurance 
gap—the  proportion  of  the  popula-
tion who lack coverage, whether vol-
untarily  or  involuntarily.       The  bar 
graph shows the percentage of people 
not insured in 2005-2007, for the U.S. 
and  selected  states.    (Census  views 
the underlying survey data by state as 
too  shaky  to  warrant  relying  on  just 
one year.)  Connecticut and the other 
New  England  states  were  well  below 
the national average, but so were 24 of 
the remaining 45 states (including the 
District of Columbia).  A handful of 
large states with big immigrant popu-
lations—especially  California,  Florida 
and  Texas—pushed  up  the  national 
average to 15.4%.
  Massachusetts, at 8.3% uninsured, 
was tied for lowest with Hawaii.  So 
the Bay State started its health insur-
ance experiment with one of the lowest 
health  insurance  gaps  in  the  nation.   
That  could  cut  two  ways,  of  course.   
Massachusetts could face the most chal-
lenging cases in its push to get every-
one insured.  But the Commonwealth 
also started its experiment with a rela-
tively  deep  set  of  health  insurance 
institutions, which should increase the 
chances for success.
  Connecticut  is  probably  similar 
enough to its neighbor to be able to 
learn valuable lessons from the experi-
mental results.  The rest of the country, 
of course, may be a different story.
APAAQAhC ESSENTIAlS 
  The Massachusetts initiative is all 
about closing the health insurance gap.   
To  do  so,  it  envelops  the  existing 
patchwork  of  institutions  and  pro-
grams in a new structure of subsidies, 
mandates, reorganization, and sweeten-
ers.  Thus, the Bay State’s experiment 
is highly complex, necessarily more so 
than what the state had before. (This 
section draws heavily on a State Law 
Libraries  website,  http://www.lawlib.
state.ma.us/healthinsurance.html,  and 
a more detailed summary to be found 
through an uplink from that site, “MA 
Health  Care  Reform  Law  of  2006, 
ACT”.)
SUBSIDIES
  The  subsidy  provisions  of 
APAAQAHC include beefed up ben-
efits  and  higher  enrollment  caps  for 
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the poor and disabled, under the exist-
ing MassHealth program, and sliding-
scale,  below-cost  premiums  for  low 
income uninsured persons, in the new 
Commonwealth  Care  plan.    Under 
the  latter,  premiums  are  zero  up  to 
150% of the federal poverty line (FPL) 
($31,800/family  of  4  in  2008),  and 
the sliding-scale premiums apply from 
150% up to 300% of FPL ($63,600/
family of 4).
MANDATES
  These provisions include individu-
al and employer mandates.
  Under  the  individual  mandate, 
every  Massachusetts  resident  (with 
minor  exceptions  having  to  do  with 
“affordability”)  must  be  covered  by 
health  insurance.    This  mandate  is 
enforced  through  a  state  income-tax 
surcharge equal to one-half of the cost 
of the lowest available yearly premium.   
One  potential  flaw  here  is  that  the 
penalties won’t hit (poorer) people who 
don’t file income tax returns.  Another 
potential  flaw  is  that  (richer)  young 
people  may  still  choose  to  go  unin-
sured, to avoid paying the other half of 
that lowest-cost premium.  Of course, 
negligent  poor  people  and  truculent 
yuppies may now find ERs demanding 
upfront  payment,  because  providers 
may not be reimbursed for their treat-
ments out of “Safety Net” funds.
  Under  the  employer  mandate, 
firms with more than 10 workers must 
either  provide  “fair  and  reasonable” 
premium contributions towards health 
insurance  coverage  for  their  workers, 
or else pay the Commonwealth a “fair 
share” fine of up to $295 per employee 
per  year.    Here  again,  APAAQAHC 
seems  to  have  a  built-in  flaw:  Aren’t 
“fair and reasonable” annual contribu-
tions  for  employee  health  insurance, 
even in a group plan, likely to exceed 
the fine of $295 per employee?
REORGANIzATION
  Presiding over the whole construct 
just described is a new state authority, 
the Commonwealth Health Insurance 
Connector.    The  Connector  will  set 
the  subsidy  levels  under  MassHealth 
and Commonwealth Care, and decide 
what constitutes “affordability” under 
the  individual  mandate.  And  it  also 
serves as a clearinghouse for the new 
non-subsidized  “Commonwealth 
Choice” program offered to individu-
als and firms with 50 or fewer work-
ers.    Commonwealth  Choice  offers 
three  levels  of  plans  (Bronze,  Silver 
and Gold), through six selected (“Seal 
of Approval”) insurers, which eligible 
workers  and  their  families  may  buy 
with  pre-tax  dollars.    (Any  Seal  of 
Approval plan may also be purchased 
directly from one of the approved car-
riers.)   The  chosen  six  firms—which 
span  90%  of  the  commercial  health 
insurance  market—must  also  offer  a 
lower-priced  Young  Adults  Plan  for 
18-26 year olds.  Further, 
   The  reorganization  also  requires 
that  all  Massachusetts-based  health 
insurers (i) observe all state mandated 
coverages; (ii) extend family coverage 
of young adults for 2 years after they 
cease to be dependents, or until they 
reach  age  25,  whichever  comes  first; 
(iii) merge individual policies into their 
small-group products; and (iv) permit 
multiple  employers  to  contribute  to 
part-time workers’ premiums.
SWEETENERS
  Finally,  to  mitigate  health-care 
providers’  resistance  to  participating, 
“NEWLY-INSUREDS” IN MASS.
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the state will pay hospitals and physi-
cians $90 million more per year, for 
three  years,  than  they  would  have 
received  under  the  previous  system.   
This  will  happen  by  increasing  rates 
on  state-provided  services  from  80% 
of costs to 95% of costs in three equal 
annual increments.  To qualify for the 
higher rates, hospitals must meet qual-
ity benchmarks (presumably, adminis-
tered by the Connector).
PAyING ThE BIll
  Closing  gaps  typically  means  an 
increase  in  services,  and  thus  higher 
costs.  Health insurance is no excep-
tion,  at  least  if  we’re  talking  about 
tricking  out  the  existing  system  as 
opposed (say) to switching to a single-
payer plan, which could, according to 
its  proponents,  reduce  total  adminis-
trative costs. 
  APAAQAHC  does  contain  two 
measures intended to reduce costs by 
making better use of existing resourc-
es.  First, requiring everyone to have 
health insurance is supposed to reduce 
the use of emergency rooms for rou-
tine and non-life-threatening ailments.   
Hospital  ERs  have  higher  costs  per 
visit than regular physician offices, and 
non-emergency  use  of  ERs  imposes 
congestion  costs.    Waiting  times  for 
treatment, tantamount to unused labor 
services, are notoriously longer in ERs 
than  in  physician  offices.    Second, 
under  a  waiver  negotiated  with  the 
Federal  government,  in  the  first  year 
Massachusetts was permitted to trans-
fer  nearly  $400  million  in  matching 
Medicaid  funds  intended  to  pay  for 
health  care  for  low-income  residents, 
to  help  cover  the  cost  of  subsidized 
health insurance for those people.  The 
Feds  were  persuaded  to  renew  the 
waiver in 2008 for three more years.
  Nevertheless,  the  total  cost  of 
Commonwealth  Care—the  principal 
net addition to the state budget under 
APAAQAHC—for  the  first  year  and 
the projected cost for the second year 
have both outpaced original forecasts, 
opening up a funding gap as the cov-
erage  gap  has  narrowed.    According 
to a state source, “Health Connector 
Facts & Figures, October 2008”, the 
projected first-year cost of $472 mil-
lion turned out to be nearly one-third 
higher ($153 million) at $625 million.   
The original estimate for fiscal 2009 of 
$725  million  has  now  become  $869 
million, up another $144 million.  In 
response,  the  state  has  had  to  raise 
some  fees  and  unrelated  taxes  (e.g., 
everyone’s favorite, on cigarettes).  
  The  explanation  offered  for  the 
cost  increases  is  higher-than-expected 
enrollments in the new program.  The 
same  source  claims  a  total  gain  in 
“newly insured” of 439,000 since April 
2006 (see table, page 15).  Not all of the 
gain traces to the new law, but 176,000 
participants, or 40% of the total gain, 
occurred in the new Commonwealth 
Care plan.  It’s likely, too, that a size-
able chunk of the 72,000 new enroll-
ees in MassHealth (Medicaid) are the 
result of the expanded access to that 
plan under APAAQAHC.
  A  handy  measure  of  how  effec-
tive the Massachusetts health insurance 
experiment  has  been  is  its  first-year 
impact  on  the  number  of  provider 
visits and their total cost under the so-
called Health Safety Net (HSN).  This 
program, which predates APAAQAHC 
and was formerly known more mun-
danely  as  the  Uncompensated  Care 
Pool,  pays  for  medical  care  if  your 
income is less than 400% of FPL and 
you don’t qualify for subsidized insur-
ance.  As the nearby bar graph shows, 
between  2007-Q3—the  first  quarter 
in which APAAQAHC began to take 
effect—and 2008-Q3, the number of 
visits  under  HSN  fell  by  37%,  and 
total HSN payments fell by 41%.
  Do  the  declines  in  HSN  usage 
represent  real  savings?  Assume  that 
the  reduction  of  148,000  HSN  vis-
its is reflected in the 439,000-person 
increase  in  newly  insureds  claimed 
by  the  state,  and  that  the  formerly 
uninsured made only one trip to the 
ER per year.  Then their share of the 
$869 million state health insurance tab 
comes to $293 million.  In contrast, 
the avoided health safety net costs, $68 
million, were less than one-quarter of 
that amount.  Clearly, health insurance 
offers a broader range of care than does 
ER treatment.  But it is also consider-
ably more expensive.    
“IT’S ThE INCENTIVES, STUPID!”
  One party missing from the dis-
cussion  to  this  point  is  people—the 
consumers of all the health insurance 
and services.  The key aspect of any 
health insurance reform for people is 
incentives.
  APAAQAHC  is  big  on  man-
dates—that is, on negative incentives.   
It also offers subsidies, to make cover-
age  more  affordable  for  low-income 
people.  And the Massachusetts experi-
ment  is  built  around  the  pervasive 
existing  health  insurance  plans  that 
provide  a  lot  of  “first-dollar  cover-
age”—that  is,  relatively  low  co-pays 
and  deductibles—and  little  coverage 
for preventive measures not provided 
by  medical  professionals  (e.g.,  fitness 
“HEALTH SAFETY NET” USAGE, 2007 - 2008
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club memberships).  The problem with 
such plans—which are to a great extent 
the  product  of  the  tax-exempt  sta-
tus accorded most employer-provided 
health insurance—is that they encour-
age  overuse  of  health  care  services, 
thus pushing up costs, and discourage, 
or  at  least  don’t  encourage,  people 
from getting and staying fit.  This set 
of  incentives  lies  at  the  heart  of  the 
financial  shakiness  of  virtually  every 
single-payer, universal health insurance 
system, such as those in Canada and 
Western Europe.  Cost pressures lead 
inexorably  to  rationing  and  unequal 
access  to  health  care  across  income 
classes.
  Thus,  APAAQAHC  resembles 
the  proposals  advanced  by  most  of 
the Democratic Presidential hopefuls, 
and  most  recently  by  Senator  Max 
Baucus (D-MT).  The proposals put 
forward  by  their  Republican  coun-
terparts stress substituting private for 
public  arrangements  and  paying  for 
them  with  (what  else?)  tax  cuts  and 
credits.    (Ironically,  then-Governor, 
later-GOP  Presidential  hopeful  Mitt 
Romney signed APAAQAHC into law 
in 2006.)  But neither party’s propos-
als  had  much  room  for  “health  sav-
ings accounts” (HSAs), which provide 
incentives  to  insureds  to  take  better 
care of themselves, and (when they fall 
ill) to seek the most cost-effective treat-
ments.
  Instead  of  providing  insurance 
that pays part of the cost of treating 
illnesses,  HSAs  give  people  money 
to  spend  on  health  care—but  allow 
recipients to keep much if not all of 
any unspent funds at (say) the end of 
each “insurance year”.  To cover really 
big  health  care  outlays,  HSAs  may 
be supplemented with high-deductible 
conventional  health  insurance—also 
known  as  “catastrophic”  coverage—
which is much cheaper than insuring 
first-dollar outlays.  To confer the same 
income-tax  status  as  employer  health 
insurance  contributions  enjoy,  HSA 
funds may be tax-exempt until spent 
on non-medical items.
  Where such plans have been tried 
(e.g., among public school employees in 
northern California), they have worked 
well,  been  popular  with  employees, 
and saved employers money compared 
with more conventional types of cov-
erage.  HSAs, which replaced an ear-
lier version known as “medical savings 
accounts”, were introduced in the 2003 
bill that extended Medicare coverage to 
prescription drugs.  To this point, they 
have  not  proved  very  popular:  as  of 
January 2008, an estimated 6.1 million 
Americans (2.4% of those insured) were 
covered by HSA plans—some 4.6 mil-
lion in employer plans and another 1.5 
million in individual plans—according 
to a survey.  Those figures may be low, 
according to an April 2008 report by 
the  U.S.  Government  Accountability 
Office (GAO). The same study found 
that  nearly  half  of  the  people  with 
HSA-type  coverage  were  paying  for 
it  with  after-tax  dollars.    (Refer  to 
Wikipedia, “health savings accounts”, 
for more details.)
   Why  have  HSAs  not  been  more 
popular?  One knock on them, espe-
cially  among  Democrats,  is  that 
insureds  will  put  off  getting  needed 
health care and spend the money on 
other things (including income taxes!).   
Another  reason,  one  suspects,  is  that 
it is difficult for many people to stay 
fit, or (once fallen from grace) to get 
fit again.  But people will recognize, or 
may be educated to do so, that defer-
ring needed health care often leads to 
worse, more expensive problems next 
year or the year after.  Also, they may 
save all or part of their unused HSA 
against  unexpected  future  medical 
costs.  And a financial incentive to get 
and stay fit would make it less difficult 
for the less disciplined among us.
  The  best  argument  for  HSAs  is 
that they likely offer the best chance 
of providing universal health insurance 
coverage  that  won’t  break  the  bank 
because of excessive use of health care 
services  and  insufficient  attention  to 
health maintenance. 
BOTTOM lINE
  APAAQAHC seems to have shown 
that significant, rapid strides towards 
closing  the  health  insurance  gap  are 
possible at manageable cost—in a rela-
tively wealthy state with deep health-
insurance institutions and one of the 
lowest rates of non-insurance to begin 
with.  Connecticut fits the description, 
so we will want to keep a close eye on 
the Massachusetts experiment.
  But APAAQAHC also personifies 
the worst of the incentives in the exist-
ing American health insurance system, 
writ large.  Thus, there is a real risk 
that  the  Bay  State’s  bold  experiment 
will wind up with too much first-dol-
lar coverage, too much treatment, too 
little individual responsibility for stay-
ing healthy—and unsustainable costs, 
unless we’re ready to impose rationing, 
with all its problems of unequal access 
to health care.
John  Kingsdale,  executive  director 
of the Connector, defends the mount-
ing  costs  as  part  of  the  rationale  for 
APAAQAHC,  saying  that  “the  state’s 
first  priority  was  to  expand  cover-
age,  and  then  later  address  costs” 
(Healthcare  News,  July  2,  2008).   
Thus,  the  cost  pressures  would  force 
“the  political  leadership  …  to  make 
this affordable.”
  Worries that Kingsdale’s optimism 
is little more than spin could induce 
other states to be wary of Massachusetts’ 
sweeping  reform  of  health  insurance 
access.  In fact, such worries may be 
behind the more piecemeal approach 
of the Rell administration, which has 
only gradually scaled up its controver-
sial  Charter  Oak  program  for  unin-
sured adults after adding it in 2006 to 
the existing Husky Care program for 
uninsured children. 